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TUITION TAX RELIEF: 
A CONDUIT FOR REGULATION? 
Steven Alan Samson 
March 2, 1982 
The Nature of the Problem 
What becomes of religious "free exercise" when the state creates 
institutions for "secular purposes" which exclude outwardly religious 
activities on the theory that Church and state must be kept separate? 
Such is the case we find today with respect to public education. The 
situation may be described--in answer to the ~uestion--as problematic 
at best. 
The U. S. Supreme Court has handed down a series of decisions 
since Lemon y. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1972), at 614, cautioning pub-
lic authorities to avoid "excessive entanglement between government 
and religion." Some manner of commerce between Church and State is 
unavoidable because civic life is not so easily compartmentalized. 
Nevertheless, in banning religious activities from tax-supported 
schools, the State has created human preserves that are deliberately 
isolated from the normal flow of daily commerce. From a theological 
standpoint, the state has dedicated these schools, in effect, to a 
"holy" purpose, separating them from common or profane uses. By taking 
such actions, the State is presumably purifying these vessels and pro-
tecting their contents from environmental or ritual contaminants. It 
is not difficult to justify the taking of security precautions in 
national defense facilities in order to prevent infiltration by enemy 
agents. No such rationale is acknowledged, however, in the case of 
public schools. The explanation must involve the purposes fOr which 
public education is instituted. 
This situation creates a number of constitutional dilemmas and 
must therefore be justified. Classifications based on religious 
distinctives and State-supported religious discrimination are ]rima 
facie constitutionally suspect. Such discrimination involves 
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the making of "invidious comparisons" which have the effect of placing 
some citizen-taxpayers in an inferior political status. A violation 
of civil rights by the state does not have to involve malicious intent. 
The key is a discriminatory "effect." Chief Justice Burger stated this 
principle well with respect to religious freedom in Walz y. Tax Commis~ 
sion, 397 u.s. 664 (1970), at 669: 
Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must ••• turn on 
whether particular acts in ~uestion are intended to establish 
or interfere with religious beliefs or have the effect of 
doing so. 
This would appear to be violated in the case of public schools. 
~axpayers are compelled by law to support public schools, even though 
these institutions do not permit activities which are otherwise consti-
tutionally guaranteed and which, it may reasonably be argued, have a 
direct relevance to any educational ~Jh.terprise. Moreover, public 
schools are a uni~ue case. Even soldiers and prisoners are not (yet) 
denied the services of clergy or the freedom to worship within the 
confines of tax-supported institutions. While perennial efforts are 
made to restrict tax exemptions for church property and exclude 
religious activities from all public facilities, such actions would 
effectually nullify the religious guarantees of the Constitution. 
They would also reduce some taxpayers--those who felt burdened by 
having to support religious discrimination--to the level of second 
class citizens. Some of them would affirm this is the case already. by 
observing that religion is unconstitutionally established via public 
education because education is necessarily a religious activity, 
establishing and inhibiting particular religious beliefs. 
The preemption of some religious viewpoints from public education 
may thus be construed as the establishment some other viewpoint as 
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orthodoxy. A recent federal district court decision in Arkansas 
illustrates this point. In overruling a law requiring equal time for 
presenting both the creation and the evolution versions of human 
origins i~ public classrooms, the judge undercut the basis for 
permitting the teaching of creation at all. His decision clearly 
established as "true" the evolution hypothesis and, by implication if 
not by forthright statement, disestablished as "false" the creation 
account. It is evident from this that the purpose of public education, 
as perceived by the federal judge, is indoctrination rather than the 
free exchange of ideas in the marketplace. Rival, unorthodox doctrines 
are thus ruled out of court. The control--by regulation or prohibition--
of possible rivals is essential to the establishment of any monopoly 
or orthodoxy. 
A monopoly may occur in the absence of competitors, when there is 
collusion, or when competitors are placed under legal restraints that 
favor a particular firm. It is hard to deny, for instance, that the 
u. S. Postal Service is a monopoly, even though it has a few competitors 
in specific areas of service, such as parcel delivery, and though 
alternatiiVe means o]f,distant personal communication exist, such as 
the telegraph and the telephone. Likewise, public schools are dis-
tinguished by two features characteristic of a government monopoly: 
1. They are paid for by taxation imposed by the police power of 
the people. 
2. Attendance is compelled by that same police power and failure 
to attend brings a penalty under the law. (Ingram, 1959: J) 
As with any monopoly, some degree of state intervention into the 
affairs of competitors is thus inherent in our public education 
system. Through powers delegated to it by law, the public education 
bureaucracy--federal, state, and local--effectively sets the agenda 
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for all schools by setting the public example. It is able to 
do so because of sheer size. But it also lobbies Congress and state 
legislatures, directly or indirectly through its many allies, for 
laws that will set standards of performance that will affect all 
schools, private and religious as well as public. Private and 
church-affiliated schools must operate in the context of this govern-
ment monopoly and adjust their programs accordingly, despite legal 
safeguards which restrict interference by the State. This was 
clearly understood by the majority in Pierce y. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), a decision which struck down an Oregon law that 
compelled all children to attend public schools: 
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably 
to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their 
teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age 
attend some school, that teachers be of good moral character and 
patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to 
good citizenship be taught, and that nothing be taught that is 
manifestly inimical to the public welfare. (at 534) 
The success of private schools has long been an offense to many 
within the public education establishment. Abolition of tax exemptions, 
public services, and even the private schools themselves, has been 
perennially advocated. James Bryant Conant, for instance, once wrote 
that the "greater the proportion of our youth who attend independent 
schools, the greater the threat to our democratic unity." (Quoted in 
Ingram, 1962: 6) An educational free market is frequently characterized 
as destructive of public education. Efforts to abolish private education 
were blocked by the Supreme Court in Pierce, but on the basis of property 
values, not civil liberties. An awkward compromise has been the result, 
satisfying neither militant public education advocates or private educators. 
Standardization has still been the result, despite the Court's disclaimer, 
particularly as a result of federal legislation, even though "the child is 
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not the mere creature of the state." (268 U.s. 510, at 535) Such 
standardization has provided the state with additional leverage with 
which to control private education. A group of parents in Ohio 
were sued in 1974 for truancy--"failure to send children to school"--
because the state held that the Christian school they attended did not 
meet the "minimum standards" set by the State Board of Education in 
1970. (Grover, 1977: 5) The case was finally won by the parents on 
appeal in state of Ohio y. Whisner, 47 Ohio st. 2d 181 (1976). The 
Court held that 
these standards are so pervasive and all-encompassing that total 
compliance with each and every standard by a non-public school 
would effectively eradicate the distinction between public and 
non-public education, and thereby deprive these appellants of 
their traditional interest as parents to direct the upbringing and 
education of their children. (at 215) 
What is true of minimum standards is likely to be no less true of 
tuition relief plans or any proposals that give the appearance of 
being subsidies. They are invitations to regulatory intervention. They 
are likely to help erase any distinctives that private education has 
to offer. The definition of education is being narrowed so that it 
is considered sOlely in the context of the practical preparation of 
children for the customary roles they are expected to assume as adult 
citizens. By implication, whatever is omitted is incidental and 
unimportant. Religious training is thus effectively preempted, even 
within nominally religious schools. 
Increasingly, many--perhaps most--private schools have little to 
distinguish them from public schools other than the additional expense 
they involve to the families that send them there. The underlying 
educational philosophy that governs them may resemble that of the 
local public schools. Parental involvement mayor may not be greater, 
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achievement scores mayor may not be higher, and admission standards 
mayor may not be highly selective. More important is the ~uestion of 
who sets the agenda. The standardization of teacher training, 
textbook selection, accreditation re~uirements, and curriculum content 
guarantee a high degree of comparability between pUblic, private, and 
sectarian religious schools. The professional establishment that pas 
grown over the last 150 years virtually assures what John Dewey called 
"a common faith." (Dewey, 1934) Even home education, which is getting 
increasing attention as an alternative, is likely to follow the lead 
of the professional orthodoxies. 
What is the solution? The issues may be confronted at several 
points. The most obvious points are the pillars that uphold the 
pubic school system: taxation and compulsory school attendance. It 
is possible to have compulsory school attendance without tax-supported 
schools. It is also possible to have tax-supported schools without 
compulsory school attendance laws. Neither is likely without the 
other, and the drift in the post-Civil War period was in favor of both. 
Some inroads have been made against the blanket application of 
compulsory school attendance laws. But even the Court's decision in 
Wisconsin y. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which excepted Amish parents 
from sending their children to school after the eighth grade, may 
make little more than a small dent in these laws. The tendency of 
public education advocates to press for a lengthening of the period 
of compulsory attendance may simply be nipped by exceptions made by 
the COLITtS. There is nothing to prevent states from instituting 
mandatory pre-school except, perhaps, the state of public finances. 
More attention is being given to introducing greater freedom of 
choice through various tax plans, despite the venerable custom of 
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using taxes for regulatory purposes. (Lee, 1973) Tuition tax credits 
and education vouchers have been proposed largely to overcome perceived 
financial inequities and to introduce greater freedom of choice or 
competition between schools. They have been opposed as elitist and 
ethnically or racially imbalanced. The question whether they may serve 
as conduits for greater government regulation has been largely ignored. 
Proponents of tuition tax relief have advanced several plans 
during the last two decades designed to provide financial relief to 
families that send their children to private or church-affiliated 
schools. They are justified on the basis of free market theory, 
social equality, civil liberties, and religious freedom. (McCarthy, 
1981: 175-1777) Controversies surrounding these plans have turned 
on two major points: the separation of Church and state, and the 
survival of public and/or private education. Dozens of national 
educational, labor, and public interest organizations have lined up on 
either side of the issue. The lines have remained fairly stable for 
several years. 
The growing federal role in education since the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 has converged with a series of Supreme Court 
decisions on religious education to create a dilemma for church-
affiliated and independent religious schools. Title IX of the 1972 
ESEA amendments added a new regulatory dimension by stating that "if any 
students in a college receive federal assistance, the school must be classi-
fied as a 'recipient institution' and must comply with the hundreds of 
regulations imposed on Government-supported schools by the (then-) 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." (Time, April 24, 1978, 
p. 73) This rule has been applied against colleges, such as Hillsdale 
College in Michigan, which do not otherwise accept federal aid. 
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It is potentially as all-embracing as the Supreme Court's application 
of the Commerce Clause in the 1960s in support of the Civil Rights 
Act. It threatens the independence of private schools, and creates added 
Church-State entanglements in the case of religious schools. G. I. 
benefits and guaranteed student loans have served as a wedge for 
federal intervention into school policies and have had an untold 
impact on the operation of religious schools, which typically lose 
all identity as such within a generation or two of their founding. 
Tuition tax credits and education vouchers likely would have 
similar conse~uences. But this ~uestion may be studied only through 
analogy. No such program has been in effect for more than a decade, 
although there have been programs that bear some resemblances to 
current proposals. Any such program would raise constitutional 
~urstions on at least two grounds: first, that their purpose and 
effect is to foster religion, and, second, that government stipulations 
or regulations Over the'use of such aid would foster "excessive 
entanglement." School administrators might find it financially 
and politically difficult to refuse such aid, just as city administrators 
find it difficult to explain a reluctance to get some of their local 
taxpayers' federal tax money back. 
The fate of tuition tax relief plans may be inextricably bound up 
with the Church-State issue for political reasons. It is highly 
~uestionable that any plan that excluded religious schools would 
enjoy much popular support. These are <the constitutional and 
political difficulties that must be confronted if any solution is to 
be found. 
